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Bank Monitoring Incentives and Borrower Earnings Management: 





We examine banks’ disincentives to monitor borrower earnings management activity during the Japanese 
banking crisis of 1993-2002.  We show that during this period, a period characterized by significant 
deterioration in the financial health of the Japanese banking sector, firms that borrow a large amount of 
short-term loans from their main bank manage earnings more aggressively around public equity offerings.  
This result derives largely from the subsample of offerings by poorly performing firms that maintain 
lending relationships with main banks that are in weak financial health.  We also find a significant 
decrease in post-offering short-term lending by the main banks for firms that manage earnings upward 
prior to the offerings.  In contrast, we do not find such results during the boom period of 1983-1992.  Our 
results suggest that, when they are under great pressure for survival, Japanese main banks have few 
incentives to monitor corporate managers, and act primarily in the interests of short-term creditors.  
 
Key words: Main banks, Short-term creditors, Monitoring, Lending relationship, Public equity offerings,              
                     Earnings management, Discretionary current accruals. 
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The banking literature emphasizes the positive role of banks in providing client firms valuable 
monitoring functions (Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), Fama (1985), Sharpe (1990), Diamond (1984, 
1991)).  Banks provide loans and diverse financial services to firms with which they have an ongoing 
relationship.  This continuous and stable bank-firm relationship allows the bank to acquire information 
about the borrowing firm and gives the bank a competitive advantage in monitoring the firm.  As such, a 
bank can reduce client firms’ informational asymmetry and managerial incentive problems. 
However, it is not clear whether banks always perform a valuable monitoring function for their client 
firms, particularly when they experience large negative shocks.  Banking shocks may affect banks’ 
incentives to monitor borrowing firms for several reasons.  For example, during a banking crisis, banks 
are usually saddled with large amounts of bad loans and the bank regulatory authority is likely to require 
troubled banks to set aside more capital against their expected future loan losses.  These bad loan 
problems and additional capital requirements can create incentives for banks to take actions that preserve 
their claims on borrowers rather than take actions that maximize borrower value.  As the 1997-1998 
Asian financial crisis demonstrated, bad loan problems can also influence banks to engage in the 
misallocation of credit.  For instance, in tightening the credit available to unhealthy borrowers, banks may 
decide to curtail lending to risky firms with good future prospects.  Alternatively, banks may decide to 
continue lending to financially weak borrowers since doing so tends to make the bank’s balance sheet 
look better and enables borrowers to make interest payments on outstanding loans (Peek and Rosengren 
(2005)).  This misallocation of bank credit in turn forces firms to make suboptimal investment decisions 
such as passing up positive net present value projects, delaying needed restructuring, and engaging in 
asset substitution.   
In addition to these perverse incentives faced by banks, during a banking crisis, banks are not likely to 
have enough resources to monitor their client firms, further creating banks’ disincentives to assume the 
role of the active monitor.  Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) argue that the intensity of monitoring by 
financial institutions is positively related to the amount of their capital invested in client firms 
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(monitoring capital) relative to firm capital.  To the extent that during a banking crisis monitoring capital 
is scarcer than firm capital and loan losses and asset price deflation significantly reduce the equity of the 
banking sector, Holmstrom and Tirole’s (1997) argument suggests that bank monitoring is less likely to 
be intense during a banking crisis than during a non-crisis.  
In this paper we examine banks’ incentives to monitor corporate managers using the Japanese 
banking crisis during the 1990s as the research setting.  Specifically, using earnings management around 
public equity offerings by Japanese firms as a measure for managerial opportunistic behaviors, we 
investigate how banks’ incentives (disincentives) to monitor corporate opportunistic behavior differ 
during two distinct economic conditions, the boom period (1983 – 1992), during which Japanese banks 
aggressively increased lending to the corporate sector, and the crisis period (1993 – 2002), during which 
the Japanese economy experienced a significant deterioration in the financial health of the banking 
sector.1  
Our focus on Japanese banks is motivated by two factors, namely, the importance of bank 
relationships in Japan and the difficulties of the Japanese banking sector in the 1990s.  First, unlike in the 
U.S., many Japanese firms obtain a substantial fraction of their debt financing from a single commercial 
bank that is their main bank (Aoki, 1990).2  Moreover, whereas the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 precludes 
U.S. banks from owning stocks, Japanese banks are allowed to invest in the equity of other companies.  
Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) consider a manager who has an incentive to continue projects even when it 
is optimal to terminate them.  They show that such suboptimal decision can be avoided with a presence of 
an informed creditor with a fixed fraction claim, such as equity.  Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) suggest 
that Japanese banks represent an example of such informed investors.  Kang and Stulz (1996) also view 
1 Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) and Rangan (1998) find that in the U.S., firms that conduct seasoned equity 
offerings manage earnings through accounting accruals, and that subsequent earnings and stock return 
underperformance are correlated with the level of earnings management during the equity issuance period.  Erickson 
and Wang (1999) and Louis (2004) also report evidence consistent with pre-merger earnings management by 
acquiring firms, particularly stock-for-stock acquirers.  These results suggest that acquirers engage in earnings 
management in order to inflate their stock prices and thus reduce the exchange ratio. 
2 Sometimes this main bank relation is part of a group network, or keiretsu, although firms that do not belong to 
a keiretsu also maintain ties to a main bank. 
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that the long-term investors in Japan such as banks are like the fixed-fraction investors analyzed in 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1994).  In a similar vein, Jensen (1989) argues that the joint ownership of debt and 
equity claims by informed investors results in stringent managerial monitoring and creates strong 
incentives for managers to make value-maximizing decisions.  These studies suggest that the role of 
banks in corporate governance is more important in Japan than in the capital market-based system of the 
U.S. (Aoki (1990), Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991), Kaplan (1994), Kaplan and Minton (1994), 
Kang and Shivdasani (1995)).  Consequently, should the effect of bank monitoring on corporate earnings 
management exists, it is more likely to surface in Japan than in a capital-market-based system such as the 
U.S.  Second, in the early 1990s the Japanese banking sector started to face considerable problems 
limiting its ability to renew loans or extend new loans to firms.  These bank difficulties were of a scale 
that even Long Term Credit Bank of Japan, which was the 9th largest bank in the world, collapsed in 
1998.  Thus, the difficulties in the Japanese banking sector during the 1990s, together with Japan’s close 
bank-firm ties, make Japan a good testing ground for investigating how the changing economic conditions 
affect banks’ incentives to monitor corporate managers.  
We posit that although the main bank as a monitor generally has strong incentives to discourage the 
opportunistic financial reporting behavior of equity-issuing borrowers prior to an offering,3 it does not 
have such incentives during a banking crisis, possibly due to its desire to preserve its claims on 
borrowers.  Ahn and Choi (2009) argue that the extent of borrower earnings management is directly 
related to the qualitative measure of credit risk (i.e., the competency of a borrowing firm’s management 
and the reliability of its financial statements).  For example, the higher the borrower’s income-increasing 
accrual management is, the lower the quality of management becomes.  The borrower that engages in 
aggressive accrual management is also likely to have lower quality earnings.  Since these lower 
management and earnings qualities have an adverse effect on borrower credit risk, banks as creditors 
should have strong incentives to monitor diligently for borrower income manipulation.  However, during 
3 Supporting this view, Ahn and Choi (2009) show that a borrowing firm’s earnings management in the U.S. 
deceases as the magnitude of a bank loan increases.  
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a crisis, a borrower’s ability to generate sufficient cash flow to repay the loan’s principal and interest 
becomes a critical concern for the bank.  Thus, the main bank faced with regulatory requirements to set 
aside more capital has incentives to engage in opportunistic behaviors in order to avoid classifying their 
existing loans as nonperforming or to accumulate more cash reserves for future adverse events.  Equity 
offerings improve a firm’s cash position, which in turn, improves the firm’s ability to service its debt.  
Consequently, during a crisis, the main bank that wants to protect its loan claims will have few incentives 
to discourage the borrower’s income-increasing reporting activity prior to an offering since such activity 
inflates the offering price and thus increases the proceeds from the offering.   
Moreover, during a crisis, banks tend to attach a low value to their reputational capital or do not have 
enough resources to monitor their client firms, creating additional disincentives to monitor firms.   
Consistent with results that correspond to the U.S., we find significant earnings management around 
public equity offerings in Japan, but with a large cross-sectional variation.  The regression analysis shows 
that during 1993-2002, firms that borrow a large amount of short-term loans from their main bank 
manage earnings more aggressively around public equity offerings.  This result derives largely from the 
subsample of offerings by poorly performing firms that maintain lending relationships with main banks 
that are in weak financial health.  In contrast, we do not find such results during the boom period of 1983-
1992.  We also find that during a banking crisis, there is a significant decrease in post-offering short-term 
lending by the main banks for firms that manage earnings upward prior to the offerings.  This result, 
together with those of Peek and Rosengren (2005), suggests that during a banking crisis, Japanese banks 
allocate less credit to borrowers that are still economically viable (i.e., borrowers that are able to issue 
equity and thus might be better clients for banks) and more credit to troubled borrowers.  Overall, these 
results suggest that Japanese main banks act to maximize its interests as short-term creditors when they 
are under great pressure for survival.   
We perform several robustness checks on our tests.  In particular, we evaluate endogeneity of the 
main bank relationship, a firm’s motive to diversify financing sources, and regulatory rules concerning 
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public equity offerings in our sample period.  The results are qualitatively unchanged.  In addition, we 
find that abnormal accruals are not significantly related to abnormal offering announcement returns, 
suggesting that outside investors in Japan do not see through issuing firms’ attempts to engage in earnings 
management.  
Our paper makes an important contribution to the literature by providing evidence on the governance 
role of informed creditors during a banking crisis.  Unlike previous studies that explore the benefits of 
close bank relationships (Fama (1985), Diamond (1991), Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991), Kaplan 
(1994), Kaplan and Minton (1994), Kang and Shivdasani (1995)), we focus on the dark side of bank 
relationships (Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992), Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (1993), Gibson (1995), 
Weinstein and Yafeh (1998), Morck and Nakamura (1999), Kang and Stulz (2000)) and show how banks’ 
incentives to monitor the firms are different during boom and crisis periods.  Our work therefore extends 
the previous literature that evaluates the role of banks in corporate governance and sheds light on the 
debate regarding this role. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  In Section I, we develop the hypotheses to be tested.  In Section II, 
we explain our measures of earnings management.  Section III describes the data and sample 
characteristics and Section IV presents the empirical results.  Additional robustness tests are reported in 
Section V.  Section VI summarizes and concludes the paper.  
 
I. Hypothesis development 
The core of the Japanese corporate governance system consists of main banks.  Japanese firms 
typically obtain a substantial fraction of their debt financing from a single commercial bank, their main 
bank.  The main bank also provides the firm diverse financial services and helps it access capital markets 
by providing financial guarantees.  In addition, the main bank monitors the firm’s management and 
intervenes at times of poor performance (Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990), Sheard (1994)), 
sometimes sending directors to the firm’s board to help the firm improve its performance (Kaplan (1994), 
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Kaplan and Minton (1994), Kang and Shivdasani (1995)).  These intermediary functions performed by the 
main bank suggest that the main bank alleviates firms’ managerial incentive problems and eases capital 
constraints that financially unhealthy firms face in the market.  
However, it is not entirely clear whether main banks always perform these valuable functions for their 
client firms, particularly when the banking sector experiences a severe exogenous shock.  As Sharpe 
(1990) and Rajan (1992) note, close lending relationships enable banks to exercise significant influence 
over, and thereby expropriate rents from, borrowing firms.  For example, as firms work more closely with 
banks, they may find it harder to raise funds through other means of public financing and thus may be 
more vulnerable to being “held up” by the banks.  Supporting this view, Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) 
show that firms closely related to Japanese banks do not show higher profitability or faster growth rates 
than their industry peers, and they pay relatively high interest rates on their bank loans. 
This so-called hold-up problem can be particularly severe during a banking crisis period.  When 
banks suffer from an exogenous shock and are forced to tighten credit, they become more concerned 
about the capacity of borrowers to generate sufficient future cash flow to repay the principal and interest 
on their loans, as the inability of borrowers to service their debt can have a significantly negative effect 
on a bank’s credit risk and cost of capital.  As a result, during a crisis banks are better off if their client 
firms with impending financial problems issue equity and use the offering proceeds to repay their loan 
obligations.  Furthermore, managers of equity issuing firms have incentives to manage earnings upward 
around equity offerings to maximize the proceeds from the sale (Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998), Rangan 
(1998)).  During a crisis banks may have fewer incentives to monitor the issuer’s income-increasing 
accrual management, as high reported earnings at the time of equity offerings inflate the offer price and 
thus increase the offering proceeds, which provide banks additional capital with which to buffer 
themselves against a borrower’s financial difficulties.4   
4 Japanese main banks are expected to be familiar with firms’ accrual choice decisions because of several reasons.  
For example, as the largest debtholder the main bank may have a competitive advantage over other capital market 
participants in collecting private information about the borrowing firms.  Moreover, it is not unusual for Japanese 
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In addition to this perverse incentive of banks, banks have fewer resources to monitor the borrowers 
during a crisis.  Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) argue that the intensity of monitoring by financial 
institutions varies depending on the relative amount of their monitoring capital invested in borrowers and 
it is less when such capital gets scarcer, suggesting that banks have disincentives to monitor their 
borrowers when the whole banking sector is experiencing difficulties.  
Moreover, since a large portion of bank loans in Japan are short-term loans5 and main banks usually 
have the largest debt claim on their client firms’ assets, main banks have additional incentives to welcome 
increases in offering proceeds and act in the interests of short-term creditors.   
Although high reported earnings that result from income-increasing accrual management around the 
offerings may allow firms to issue equity at higher prices (Kim and Park (2005)), such accrual 
management also entails costs.  For example, if it is detected, the issuer could suffer loss of investor 
confidence, regulatory intervention and possibly jeopardize the equity issuance.  In addition, the issuer 
could be sued (DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik (2004), Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008)).  Even if the 
earnings management is undetected prior to the issuance, there should be downward pressure on stock 
prices after the issuance unless the earnings management is maintained.  During a banking crisis period, 
however, equity issuing firms, particularly those with higher short-term loans, may pay less attention to 
such costs because these firms are likely to face fewer interventions from their banks due to banks’ 
 
firms to have representatives from their main bank on their boards.  Kroszner and Strahan (2001), for example, show 
that firms with an executive of their main bank on their board account for 42.8% of the 761 large firms listed on the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) in 1992, whereas the corresponding number for large U.S. firms is only 5.8%.  Kaplan 
and Minton (1994) and Kang and Shivdasani (1995) show further that Japanese main banks send directors to a client 
firm’s board in periods of financial distress.  Similarly, Morck and Nakamura (1999) find that the appointments of 
bank executives to the boards of Japanese firms outside bank groups are precipitated largely by liquidity crises.  
Because the board of directors is responsible for the preparation and presentation of financial reports, main bank 
representatives on boards could have significant information on borrowing firms’ accrual choice decisions.  Finally, 
the Association of Bank Loan and Credit Officers (Robert Morris Associates) suggests that in some cases, and 
especially in the case of a permanent capital loan, banks require borrowers to provide a listing of account receivables 
together with their aging information so that they can examine the appropriateness of the receivables’ values (Choi 
(2005)).  Banks also examine whether loans are fully covered by receivables.  To the extent account receivables are 
an important determinant of accounting accruals, banks’ oversight over receivables may allow banks to be familiar 
with client firms’ accruals decisions.   
5 For non-financial and non-utility firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange in 2002, the last year of our 
sample period, short-term bank loans with maturity less than one year on average account for 66.6% of total bank 
loans, with a median of 69.8%.   
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disincentives to monitor.  Moreover, they face greater financial distress risk due to their higher short-term 
leverage, which incentivizes them to raise larger capital to reduce financial distress risk.  These arguments 
lead to the following hypothesis: 
 
H1. During a banking crisis period, firms with close ties to their main bank, as measured by the ratio of 
loans from the main bank to the firm’s total debt (the “main bank loan ratio”), are more likely to 
increase reported earnings prior to equity offerings.  Consequently, the main bank loan ratio is positively 
related to the extent of earnings management by equity-issuing firms.  This positive effect is expected to 
be more pronounced for short-term main bank loans than for long-term main bank loans. 
 
We also expect that the disincentives faced by the main bank to monitor earnings management during 
a crisis are stronger when the main bank is financially weaker.  Since the adverse effect of future loan 
losses on investors’ expectations of the quality of a bank’s loan portfolio is particularly severe for 
financially weak banks, these banks may have fewer incentives to monitor issuer accrual management in 
order to increase the proceeds from the offerings.  Furthermore, compared to healthy banks, unhealthy 
banks may place less value on their reputational capital and have fewer resources to monitor issuer 
opportunistic behavior.  To the extent that the incentives for earnings overstatement are also particularly 
strong for the troubled firms themselves, we expect this disincentive effect to be even more pronounced 
for poorly performing firms.  These arguments lead to our second hypothesis: 
 
H2. During a banking crisis, poorly performing firms engage in more aggressive income-increasing 
earnings management if they maintain lending relationships with poorly performing or high-risk main 
banks. 
 
If the bank’s private information produces unbiased forecasts of client issuers’ future prospects, the 
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bank is more likely to be quiet about earnings management activity by the issuers about which it has 
unfavorable information.  To the extent that these issuers engage in more aggressive earnings 
management and that the bank has strong incentives to require such issuers to repay its loans, issuers with 
a higher level of earnings management around the offering are expected to experience larger declines in 
loans from their main bank after the offerings.  Alternatively, given the finding that Japanese banks 
continued lending to poorly performing firms during the crisis period (Peek and Rosengren (2005)), to 
provide required credit to these firms, Japanese banks might have strong incentives to reduce credit to 
firms that can raise capital on their own.  Since firms that engage in aggressive earnings management, if 
not detected, are more likely to be successful in raising new capital in the stock market, we expect these 
firms to experience a larger post-offering loan decline.  Thus, our third hypothesis is: 
 
H3. Main bank lending declines after the offerings substantially more for firms that manage earnings 
aggressively prior to the offerings.  This effect is more pronounced during the banking crisis. 
 
While we are not aware of any previous studies on bank-firm relationships that investigate this 
particular type of conflict, the above lines of reasoning are similar to those of studies that examine the 
impact of a deterioration in bank durability on the value of borrowers.  For instance, Slovin, Sushka, and 
Polonchek (1993) examine the effect of the near failure of Continental Illinois Bank and its subsequent 
rescue by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) on client firm value and find that the bank’s 
impending insolvency (subsequent rescue) had negative (positive) effects on client firms’ share prices.  
Gibson (1995) examines whether the health of the Japanese main bank influences the investments of 
client firms.  He shows that a firm with a low-rated main bank (AA-) invests 30% less than a firm with a 
high-rated main bank (AA+).  In a similar vein, Kang and Stulz (2000) show that Japanese firms that 
borrow more from banks suffer larger drops in stock prices and cut investments back more substantially 
during the 1990 to 1993 period.  Finally, focusing on client firms’ stock market performance, Brewer, 
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Genay, Hunter, and Kaufman (2003) find that firms with greater access to alternative sources of funding 
experience a less severe adverse impact following the announcement of bank failure, whereas Miyajima 
and Yafeh (2007) document that high leverage, low tech, and low market-to-book firms are the most 
affected by malaise in the banking sector.   These results imply that a reduction in bank durability has an 
adverse impact on both the value and the investment policy of borrowers.   
 
II. Measuring earnings management 
Earnings consist of actual cash flows and accruals.  Accruals are accounting adjustments to the firm’s 
cash flow from operations that are designed to help convey information about the firm’s true economic 
performance that is not always reflected in current cash flows.  Accrual adjustments depend on the firm’s 
business environment and management’s assessment of the magnitude and timing of actual economic 
events.  For example, firms have discretion over the choice of estimates for uncollectibles (bad debts), the 
choice of estimates for write-offs of inventory and fixed assets, and the choice of depreciation policies.  
Using this discretion, managers may manipulate accruals to convey a distorted view of the firm’s future 
prospects.  Prior research shows that accounting accruals are affected by agency issues and asymmetric 
information.6 
If managers use discretion to influence market perceptions, we expect “discretionary” accruals to 
systematically reflect the managerial intention.  To measure discretionary accruals, we use the modified 
Jones model proposed by Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995), as it is known to be the most powerful 
model in detecting earnings management among the competing models.  Specifically, we first regress 
current accruals on the difference between the change in sales revenue and the change in accounts 
receivable.  The cross-sectional regression is performed for each fiscal year in the test period using all 
non-issuing firms in the same two-digit industry code.  The estimated coefficient on the difference term is 
then used to calculate the expected accruals of the equity-issuing firms.  The residual after subtracting 
6 Healy and Wahlen (1999) provide a comprehensive review of earnings management research. 
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expected accruals from reported accruals is excess accruals.  
Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2004) show that discretionary accruals adjusted for a performance-
matched firm’s discretionary accruals, where the match is based on a firm’s industry membership and 
current-period return on assets, tend to be the best-specified measure of discretionary accruals across a 
wide variety of simulated event conditions.  Following Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2004), we subtract 
the discretionary accruals of a matching firm from those of a sample firm.  We interpret matching firm-
controlled discretionary accruals (hereafter, “adjusted discretionary current accruals”) as a proxy for 
accruals manipulation. 7   (See the Appendix for a detailed discussion on our method of measuring 
discretionary current accruals.) 
 
III. Data and sample description  
Our sample consists of Japanese firms that issued public equity in domestic markets between 1983 
and 2002.  We identify an initial sample of issuing firms from the Tokyo Stock Exchange Annual 
Securities Statistics.  We cross-reference and supplement this sample with data from Thomson Financial 
Securities data and NEEDS corporate finance-related data.  We eliminate firms belonging to either the 
financial services or utilities industries.  We also eliminate those firms that issued multiple classes of 
securities within three years prior to or subsequent to the offering, to avoid obtaining results confounded 
by multiple issues that cluster during our analysis period.8  Finally, if a firm issued equity more than once 
within a six-year period, we retain the first issue in our sample.  These screens yield a final sample of 508 
public issues.  We obtain stock price and financial data on the issuing firms from the Pacific-Basin 
7 Following Rangan (1998), Louis (2004), and Darrough and Rangan (2005), we use adjusted discretionary 
current accruals as our primary measure of earnings management throughout the paper.  In untabulated tests, we 
repeat all analyses using adjusted discretionary total accruals as a measure of earnings management and find that our 
results do not change.  When we use total accruals as a measure of earnings management, we include in equation 
(a1) in the Appendix the gross level of property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets in the beginning of the 
year as an additional explanatory variable.  Nondiscretionary total accruals in equation (a2) in the Appendix are also 
computed with this additional variable in the model. 
8 Multiple issues include those offerings in which a firm issues the same (or different) types of securities both 
privately and publicly, or in which a firm issues the same (or different) types of securities both in Japan and in 
overseas markets.  Since the managerial incentives to issue private or domestic securities are likely to be different 
from those to issue public or foreign securities, we exclude multiple issues from our analyses. 
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Capital Market (PACAP) Research Center database.  We collect data on a firm’s bank borrowings from 
various issues of Kigyo Keiretsu Soran, a comprehensive guide to Japanese firms published by Toyo 
Keizai, and supplement this information with NEEDS Bank Loans data.  
We divide our sample period into two subperiods, the pre-crisis period (1983-1992) and the crisis 
period (1993-2002).  The rationale for using 1993 to delineate the beginning of the banking crisis is as 
follows.9   Before the banking crisis, Japanese banks aggressively increased lending to the corporate 
sector; for example, according to Bank of Japan statistics, the aggregate loan balance to GDP ratio for 
Japanese banks rose from 77% in 1982 to 105% in 1989.  However, after the Nikkei 225 index and land 
prices hit their highest levels at the end of 1989 and the beginning of 1991, respectively, both stock and 
land prices started to fall as rapidly as they had gone up, ending the economic boom of the “asset bubble” 
period. With the economic slowdown, many of the loans made during the previous boom period turned 
out to be nonperforming and the resulting credit losses badly hurt bank balance sheets and bank credit 
availability (Hickock and Osler (1994)).  Japanese banks and regulatory authorities, however, were slow 
in recognizing the seriousness of the consequences of the bursting of the bubble.  For instance, facing the 
nonperforming loan problem, Japanese banks only started to shrink their loan portfolios in 1993. 10   
Similarly, it was March of 1993 when Japanese banks were first required to disclose nonperforming 
loans, which were defined rather narrowly.  Regulators made several revisions to the rules on the 
classification of nonperforming loans in the following years, increasing nonperforming loans disclosed by 
banks dramatically from 3% of total loans in 1993 to 8% of total loans in 2002.  Fukao (2003) argues that 
the amount of properly classified bad loans could be more than twice as large as the amount of bad loans 
publicly reported by individual banks.11   
9 Peek and Rosengren (2005) also use 1993 as the start of their sample period. 
10 Also in 1993, the Basel Accord risk-based capital requirement was implemented in Japan.  The requirement 
that banks disclose nonperforming loans marks the end of the period of complete denial by banks, as its 
implementation forced banks to quickly address the impending problem of their nonperforming loans.  This suggests 
that banks likely had different incentives in managing existing loans to client firms before and after the disclosure 
requirement. 
11 In untabulated tests, we define the crash period from 1990 to 2002 and obtain results that are qualitatively 
similar to those reported in the paper. 
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Table I shows the distribution of equity offerings by year and by industry.  The table indicates a 
substantial decline in the frequency of public issues during the early part of the crisis period, with only 16 
issues in the years 1993, 1994, and 1995.  A breakdown of the sample by industry shows that most of the 
issuing firms are in manufacturing (306 issues), wholesale and retail (103 issues), and construction (34 
issues).  
Table II presents descriptive statistics for our sample of issuing firms.  We measure firm-specific 
variables at the fiscal year-end that is immediately before the issue date.  The mean and median market 
values of equity are 130.5 billion yen and 37.1 billion yen, respectively.  The median issue amount is 3.7 
billion yen and the median ratio of issue amount to market value of equity is 8.8%.  We measure past 
operating performance of an issuing firm by the ratio of operating income to total assets and find that the 
median ratio is 6.2%.  The issuer’s median excess stock return relative to the market over the past one 
year is 6.3%, and the mean and median leverage (debt / total assets) ratios are 65.4% and 68%, 
respectively.  Finally, the median Tobin’s q (sum of book value of debt and market value of equity / total 
assets) is 1.75.  This number, together with the ratio of operating income to total assets and past market-
adjusted excess returns, suggest that many of our sample firms perform well before the equity issue.  
Table II also reports summary statistics on sample firms’ borrowing activities. Defining the bank loan 
ratio as the ratio of a firm’s total borrowings from banks to total debt, we find that it averages 25.4%.  The 
mean and median ratios of short-term (long-term) bank loans with maturity less (longer) than one year to 
total debt are 15.7% (9.6%) and 14% (5.8%), respectively, suggesting that short-term loans account for a 
more significant portion of debt financing of Japanese firms.  Similar to the bank loan ratio, we compute 
the main bank loan ratio as the ratio of a firm’s total borrowings from its main bank to total debt.  
Following Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990) and Aoki, Patrick, and Sheard (1994), we define the 
main bank as the firm’s largest lender. 12  Borrowings from the main bank on average account for 8.9% of 
12 In rare occasions, two banks are tied as the largest lenders.  In these cases, we examine shareholding by banks 
and existence of board members who were originally from banks, and identify the bank with the strongest 
relationship as the main bank.  
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total debt and short-term (long-term) main bank loans on average account for 5.3% (3.6%) of total debt. 
We find similar patterns for other bank loans. 
Next, Table II reports on sample firms’ ownership distribution.  The mean equity ownership positions 
of financial institutions, other corporations, and foreign investors are, respectively, 27.5%, 31.8%, and 
5.2%.  We identify each firm’s affiliation to a keiretsu using Kigyo Keiretsu Soran and Nikkei Company 
Handbook.  We consider firms as being a member of a keiretsu if they belong to any of the six bank-
centered keiretsu (Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Fuyo, DKB, and Sanwa).  According to this 
classification, 18.7% of our sample firms belong to a keiretsu. 
Finally, Table II presents information on the financial condition of the main banks of our issuing 
firms.  Since some firms have no bank borrowing (hence no main bank) and some main banks are not 
listed on the stock exchange, we conduct our tests employing these variables over a smaller sample of 404 
firms.  The mean (median) ratio of past operating income to total assets is 0.4% (0.5%).  The mean 
(median) excess stock return relative to the market over the past one year is -0.04% (-11.3%) and the 
median is significant at the 0.01 level.  Although our sample main banks perform poorly on average 
during the sample period, it should be noted that there is large cross-sectional variation in their 
performance.  The standard deviation of past operating income to total assets and the standard deviation 
of past cumulative excess returns are 0.5% and 31.6%, respectively.  We also measure bank health using 
Tobin’s q and find that it averages 1.1.  Finally, we measure the risk of main banks as the standard 
deviation of the ratio of operating income to total assets over the past ten years and find that it averages 
0.2%. 
 
IV. Empirical results  
A. Abnormal accruals 
Several studies show that managers of U.S. firms take abnormally large discretionary accruals during 
the periods surrounding public equity issuances in order to increase reported earnings (Teoh, Welch, and 
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Wong (1998), Rangan (1998), Shivakumar (2000), Anthony, Bettinghaus, and Farber (2005)).  In this 
section, we examine whether managers of Japanese firms also manage earnings around public equity 
offerings.  
Table III presents income from continuing operations scaled by prior-year total assets (ROA), cash 
flow from operations, current accruals, and adjusted discretionary current accruals for our sample firms in 
the six years surrounding the issue year.  Panel A of Table III presents ROA.  The mean ROA shows an 
improvement in the pre-issue period but a deterioration in the post-issue period; specifically, it is 6.6% in 
year –3, it rises to 7.2% in year –2 and 8.2% in year –1, it peaks in year 0 at 8.6%, and then it shows a 
monotonic decline from year 1 to year 3.  The time-series ROA profiles for our sample of firms 
conducting public equity issues mirror those of Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998).  
Panel B of Table III reports the cash flow from operations scaled by prior-year total assets, where 
cash flow from operations is defined as net income less total accruals.  The mean cash flow from 
operations shows an increase from year –3 (9.6%) to year –1 (10.3%), and then a decline in year 0 (8.3%).   
The mean cash flows decline further in year 1 and then remain steady in years 2 and 3.  The medians 
observe similar patterns.  Therefore, new public equity issues in Japan appear to take place when firms 
experience a deterioration in cash flow from operations. 
Panel C of Table III presents current accruals.  Current accruals are considerably larger in the year of 
equity issuance relative to those in other years surrounding the issues.  The mean and median current 
accruals during the pre-issue period are small and not significant.  In year 0, however, the mean and 
median current accruals increase to 3.3% and 2.9%, respectively, both of which are significant at the 0.01 
level.  Current accruals during the post-issue period remain higher than those during the pre-issue period, 
but continue to decrease from their level in year 0.  
To summarize thus far, we find that firms conduct public equity offerings when net income 
performance shows improvement but cash flow from operations deteriorates, indicating that managers 
engage in aggressive management of earnings during the offering year. 
Panel D of Table III presents the time-series profile of industry- and performance-adjusted 
discretionary current accruals.  We find that adjusted discretionary current accruals are highest in the 
offering year (the mean and median adjusted discretionary current accruals are 2.3% and 2.2%, 
respectively) and are significant at the 0.01 level.  These results are consistent with those for public equity 
offerings in the U.S. (Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998), Rangan (1998)); for example, Teoh, Welch, and 
Wong (1998) report median (mean) adjusted discretionary current accruals of 2.9% (4.9%) in year 0.  We 
also find that the mean and median adjusted discretionary current accruals in years –3 through –1 are 
statistically insignificant, and that adjusted discretionary current accruals in post-issue years are generally 
higher than those in pre-issue years, with the mean adjusted discretionary current accrual in year +1 
positive and significant.  These results suggest that managers continue to manage earnings after offerings, 
possibly reflecting the fact that managers try to avoid potential legal liability that would be triggered by 
an earnings reversal immediately after the offerings.   
In untabulated tests we also estimate discretionary accruals using alternative models introduced in the 
recent literature.  In particular, following Anthony, Bettinghaus, and Farber (2005), we estimate the 
industry- and performance-matched discretionary current accruals using the following three models: 
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where FSALESGROWTHit represents future sales growth.  The definitions of the other variables are the 
same as those in equation (1).  Model 1 is the original Jones model with no scaled intercept.  In models 2 
and 3, a scaled intercept is added along with two additional variables, namely, future sales growth and 
lagged current accruals.   Because growth firms are likely to increase their current accruals in anticipation 
of future sales, the Jones model may be misspecified for those firms.  To control for this problem we 





1 in models 2 and 3 (Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna (2003)).  With respect to current accruals, this 
variable comprises items that might reverse in the future and thus it is possible that current accruals may 
reverse within one year.  To take this possibility into account, we also include lagged current accruals 
(CAC of year t-1) in models 2 and 3. In each of these models, the discretionary current accruals are 
computed as the difference between realized current accruals scaled by total assets in year t–1 and 
expected accruals estimated using the respective models, where the coefficients are estimated every year 
for each industry.  We find that our results for adjusted discretionary current accruals are reasonably 
robust to the differences in model specifications used. 
Overall, these results suggest that adjusted discretionary current accruals increase abruptly in the year 
of public equity offerings, which is consistent with the view that issuing firms deliberately engage in 
income-increasing earnings management in order to inflate reported earnings. 
Note that the Nikkei 225 index more than quadrupled from 1983 to 1989 and then lost the substantial 
gains it had made.  To the extent that during a stock market boom, managers of firms that issue equity 
have stronger incentives to take advantage of overpricing by selling stocks to optimistic investors, their 
incentives to manipulate earnings may be particularly strong when the stock market experiences large 
positive returns.  To address this issue, in Panel A of Table IV we separate our sample into stock market 
boom (1983-1989) and bust (1990-2002) periods and present mean and median adjusted discretionary 
current accruals in the offering year by subperiod.  We find that the mean and median abnormal accruals 
during the bust period are not significantly different from those during the boom period.  Thus, positive 
and significant abnormal accruals during our sample period are not likely to be affected by the 
overvaluation of the stock market. 
To pursue further the argument that the income-increasing earnings management we document in 
Table III is the result of possible irrational exuberance during the 1980s, in Panel B of Table IV we report 
mean and median adjusted discretionary current accruals in the offering year by industry.  To the extent 
that the Japanese bubble in the 1980s was largely due to a dramatic increase in land prices (Hickock and 
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Osler (1995)), one might expect the effect of the bubble on earnings management to be more manifest in 
industries in which real estate plays an important role, such as construction and real estate.  However, the 
results in Panel B show that abnormal accruals for firms operating in construction and real estate are 
relatively small and not significant.  These results again suggest that a bubble effect is not the main reason 
for the positive abnormal accruals during our sample period.    
 
B. Determinants of adjusted discretionary current accruals  
To better understand the cross-sectional variation in accruals for our sample firms, we present the 
estimates from multivariate regressions.  We use the adjusted discretionary current accruals in the 
offering year as the dependent variable.  The regression results are presented in Table V.  
In regression (1), we regress the adjusted discretionary current accrual only on the ratio of total bank 
loans to total debt.  We find that adjusted discretionary current accruals are positively and significantly 
related to a firm’s total borrowings from its banks.  
In regression (2), we divide total loans into short-term and long-term loans.  We find that adjusted 
discretionary current accruals are positively and significantly related to a firm’s short-term borrowings, 
but are negatively and significantly related to its long-term borrowings. The negative and significant 
coefficient on long-term borrowings suggests that unlike short-term creditors who have strong incentives 
to maximize short-term earnings of their client firms, as long-term creditors, main banks perform an 
important monitoring function in alleviating firms’ managerial incentive problems. The result also 
suggests that long-term debt claim held by the main banks reduces their incentives for myopic behavior 
and allows them to take a long-term view.  
In regression (3), we further divide short-term (long-term) loans into short-term (long-term) loans 
from the main bank and short-term (long-term) loans from other banks.  We find little relation between 
abnormal accruals and short-term (long-term) loans from other banks, but a significantly positive 
(negative) relation between abnormal accruals and short-term (long-term) loans from the main bank.  The 
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regression coefficient on the short-term main bank loan ratio is 0.226 with a t-statistic of 2.41.  Evaluating 
the estimated coefficient at the mean indicates that all else equal, a 10% increase in the main bank loan 
ratio results in about a 2.3% increase in the adjusted discretionary current accruals of issuers.  Therefore, 
the effect of short-term main bank loans on earnings management seems to be both statistically and 
economically significant.  These results suggest that when the main bank lends a large amount of short-
term loans to the firms, it has disincentives to monitor such firms’ income-increasing earnings 
management around equity offerings and thereby benefits its interests as a short-term creditor, supporting 
the findings of Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) and Morck and Nakamura (1999).  
In regression (4), we include the following issue- and firm-specific characteristics as control 
variables: a keiretsu dummy,13 the ratio of the issue amount to the market value of equity, the ratio of 
operating income to total assets, Tobin’s q, ownership structure (equity ownership by financial 
institutions, equity ownership by other corporations, and equity ownership by foreign investors), firm size 
(the logarithm of the market value of outstanding equity), and a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if the offering is made after 1992.  If issue size is relatively small compared to the size of the issuing 
firm, the economic benefits from earnings management are also expected to be relatively small (Erickson 
and Wang (1999)).  We therefore expect the degree of earnings management to be an increasing function 
of relative issue size.  Next, since poorly performing firms have less ability to service their debt and their 
equity offerings are less likely to be successful, the incentives to overstate earnings are likely to be 
particularly strong for these firms.  Thus, we expect the extent of earnings management to be more 
pronounced if issuers experience poor operating performance or have low Tobin’s q.  Finally, we include 
ownership structure to control for the monitoring role performed by institutional investors, expecting a 
negative coefficient on each ownership structure variable.  However, existing shareholders might have an 
13  The firms belonging to the same keiretsu often buy and sell goods and services from one another. 
Furthermore, since keiretsu shareholders seek to keep their stake in the firm constant, they usually participate in new 
issues.  This suggests that keiretsu shareholders serve as long-term investors and thus have incentives to induce 
firms to choose accounting policies that maximize long-term value over those that temporarily boost short-term 
earnings, since the value of their transactions with the firm increases as the firm’s long-term value increases. 
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incentive to support the sale of overpriced equity and thus encourage managers to engage in income-
increasing earnings management.  In this case, we would expect a positive coefficient on ownership. 
We find that most of the firm- and issue-specific characteristics have the expected signs, although 
none of them are significant except for equity ownership by financial institutions, which has a negative 
and significant coefficient.  Controlling for the firm- and issue-specific characteristics does not change the 
significance of the coefficients on short term and long-term main bank loan ratio variables.  In unreported 
tests, we also control for industry effects, adding six industry dummy variables, and obtain results that are 
qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper. 
In sum, these findings suggest that the distribution of debt claims with a firm’s main bank is an 
important determinant of accounting accruals at the time of an equity offering: main banks do not serve as 
an active monitor for discouraging misrepresentation of earnings by the issuers to benefit their interests as 
creditors when their short-term debt claim on issuers account for a significant portion of the issuers’ total 
debt outstanding.14  
To examine the effect of a main bank’s condition on earnings management, in regressions (5) through 
(8) we employ a subsample of 404 issuers that have main banks.  We use four measures of bank condition 
and compare the abnormal accruals of poorly performing firms associated with poor-quality banks to 
other types of firms.  We partition our sample of main banks into “poor” and “good” by the sample 25th 
quartiles of their operating income to total assets, market-adjusted cumulative returns during the previous 
one year, and Tobin’s q, and by the sample 75th quartiles of the standard deviation of the ratio of 
operating income to total assets over the past 10 years.  We also separate firms into two groups according 
to their past operating performance: poorly performing firms comprise those with operating income to 
total assets smaller than the sample 25th quartile and good performing firms comprise those with operating 
14 In untabulated tests, we use a dummy variable that takes the value of one if both the short-term main bank 
loan ratio and the relative issue size are above their respective sample medians.  If the main bank extends a large 
short-term loan to the issuer prior to its offering and this issuer places a relatively large amount of equity, the 
economic benefits that the main bank can obtain from earnings management are expected to be large.  Thus, the 
level of abnormal accruals is likely to be high in this case.  Consistent with this argument, we find that the 
coefficient on this dummy variable is 0.023, with a t-statistic of 2.17, suggesting that issuers with a higher short-
term main bank loan and a larger issue size engage in earnings management more aggressively.  
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income to total assets greater than the sample 25th quartile.  In regression (5), we use an interaction term 
between a dummy variable for the main bank’s poor operating performance and a dummy variable for the 
firm’s poor operating performance.  The coefficient on this variable is positive, but not significant.  
However, when we replace a main bank’s past operating performance with a main bank’s past stock 
market performance in regression (6), the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant at 
the 0.05 level.  Thus, poorly performing firms manage earnings more aggressively when they maintain 
lending ties to a main bank with poor stock market performance.  This result suggests that weak banks 
have disincentives to discourage poorly performing issuers to engage in aggressive earnings management 
in order to increase the proceeds from the offering.  However, when we use the standard deviation of the 
ratio of the main bank’s operating income to total assets over the past 10 years and a main bank’s Tobin’s 
q as measures of a bank’s financial condition in regressions (7) and (8), respectively, the coefficients on 
the interaction terms are not significant.15  
Panel B of Table V shows the key results of our paper.  To examine whether disincentives faced by 
banks to monitor the opportunistic financial reporting behavior of equity-issuing borrowers in the offering 
year are particularly prominent during a banking crisis, we divide our sample into two subperiods, the 
pre-banking crisis period and the banking crisis period, and re-estimate the full regression separately for 
each of these two subperiods.  We find that the coefficient on the short-term main bank loan ratio is 
positive and significant only during the banking crisis period.  This result supports H1.  Furthermore, 
consistent with H2, during the banking crisis, the coefficient on the interaction term between a dummy 
variable for poor quality banks and a dummy variable for poorly performing firms is positive and 
significant, irrespective of the measure of bank condition we use (regressions (9) through (12)).  In 
contrast, none of these variables is significant in the period before the banking crisis.  These results 
15 Mechanically, firms that have higher accruals are likely to have larger working capital.  These firms may 
need to invest less of their proceeds from equity offerings into working capital and thus are more likely to pay down 
debt.   To address this issue, we include the ratio of working capital to total assets in regressions (1) through (8) and 





suggest that banks’ incentives to preserve their claims on borrowers during a crisis and the lack of their 
monitoring resources provide weak banks strong disincentives to monitor borrower accrual management.  
We also find that the coefficient on the long-term main bank loan ratio is negative and significant only 
before the banking crisis, suggesting that during the non-crisis period, the main banks with significant 
long-term lending ties to borrowers perform an important monitoring role in discouraging client firms’ 
aggressive earnings management.  Thus, long-term banking relations mitigate banks’ perverse incentives 
as short-term creditors, particularly when the economy is performing well.  Overall, the results in Panel B 
of Table V indicate that disincentives faced by main banks to monitor borrower accrual management in 
the offering year are stronger when the whole banking sector experiences difficulty and the main banks 
are exposed to more short-term lending.  These disincentives are particularly strong when weak main 
banks maintain short-term lending relationships with poorly performing.  In contrast, such disincentives 
do not exit during a boom period.  
 
C. Earnings management and post-offering lending by main banks 
To further examine whether the degree of earnings management around equity offerings during the 
banking crisis is related to bank relationships, we investigate the relation between the change in a firm’s 
loans from the main bank immediately after an equity offering and the adjusted discretionary current 
accruals in the offering year.  If the positive association between lending relationships and abnormal 
accruals during a banking crisis documented in Table V is indeed due to bank incentives to act primarily 
in the interests of short-term creditors, the banks are more likely to require the issuers that report higher 
income-increasing abnormal accruals to use the offering proceeds to repay the short-term loans.  
Therefore, as stated in H3, our argument on banks’ incentives to preserve their claims on borrowers 
during a crisis predicts that the main bank is more likely to decrease loans after the offerings as its client 
firms engage in more aggressive earnings management. 
Table VI reports the results of this test.  The dependent variable is a dummy that has a value of one if 
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loans (total loans, short-term loans, or long-term loans) to the firm increase from year -1 to year +1, and 
zero otherwise.  The first three regressions use the full sample.  The results show that the coefficient on 
adjusted discretionary current accruals in the offering year is negative and significant only in the 
regressions in which a dummy for an increase in short-term loans is used as the dependent variable.  
In the next three regressions, we use a subsample of issuers that have main banks.  We find that the 
more aggressively the firm engages in earnings management, the more likely the main bank curtails its 
short-term loans to the firm.  Recall that the short-term main bank loan ratio prior to the offerings is 
positively related to the level of discretionary accruals in Table V.  Here we find that the firms with large 
discretionary accruals experience a reduction in short-term main bank loans after the offerings.  Taken 
together, these results suggest that the firms that engage in aggressive income-increasing earnings 
management are the firms that face reduced main bank lending subsequent to the offerings.  
To examine whether incentives faced by banks to reduce loans to the firm vary depending on the 
financial health of the banking sector, we again separate the full sample into two subperiods, the pre-crisis 
period and the crisis period, and re-estimate the regressions separately for each period.  The results are 
reported in regressions (7), (8), and (9) (before the crisis) and regressions (10), (11), and (12) (during the 
crisis).  The significantly negative coefficient on adjusted discretionary current accruals is evident only in 
regression (11), which uses a dummy for an increase in short-term main bank loans during the banking 
crisis as the dependent variable.  Overall, these results are consistent with H3.  
Using data from 1993 to 1999, Peek and Rosengren (2005) examine the misallocation of bank credit 
in Japan and find that firms are more likely to receive additional bank loans if they are in poor financial 
condition.  They argue that bank incentives to “evergreen” loans arise for several reasons, including 
banks’ self-interest to avoid a further increase in its reported nonperforming loans or government pressure 
on banks to continue to lend to financially impaired firms in order to boost the employment rate.  
However, unlike our sample firms, which were able to issue equity at the market price during the crisis 
period, the sample firms that drive the key results in Peek and Rosengren (2005) are those that were not 
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economically viable and thus the loans to these firms were not likely to be profitable to the bank.  For 
example, the average operating income to total assets for our sample firms during the banking crisis is 
10.22% (the median industry-adjusted operating income to total assets is 5.08%, which is significant at 
the 0.01 level).  In comparison, the corresponding number in Peek and Rosengren (2005) is only 2.97%.16  
This suggests that our sample firms are in better financial condition than those used in Peek and 
Rosengren (2005).  Thus, it is not surprising to see the difference in bank lending behavior between the 
two studies.  In particular, while Peek and Rosengren (2005) show that Japanese banks that were under 
great pressure to meet capital adequacy requirements during the crisis continued lending to poorly 
performing firms,17 our results indicate that these banks reduce credit to financially stronger firms that 
can raise capital on their own, possibly so that they can provide required credit to poorly performing 
firms.  Our results therefore show that the misallocation of credit in Japan during the banking crisis exists 
not only for poorly performing firms, but also for relatively good performing firms.  
 
V. Sensitivity and additional tests 
A. Do discretionary accruals measure earnings management? 
While the significant income-increasing discretionary accruals in the offering year that we document 
in the previous section suggest the presence of earnings management, they are also consistent with the 
view that managers time equity offerings to follow periods of unexpectedly high accruals (Shivakumar 
(2000)).  To determine the extent to which these accruals are the result of managers’ attempts to manage 
earnings, we regress post-offering changes in net income on adjusted discretionary current accruals in 
year 0 and adjusted discretionary current accruals in year -1.  The change in net income is computed by 
subtracting net income in year 0 from each of the subsequent years’ net income. 
16 The 25th quartile of operating income to total assets for our sample is 5.0% (the 25th quartile of the median 
industry-adjusted operating income to total assets is 2.15%).  Thus, even our sample firms with the worst 
performance on average perform better than the sample firms used in Peek and Rosengren (2005). 
17 Consistent with this result, Kang and Liu (2008) find that the bank loan announcement returns for borrowing 
firms in Japan are negatively related to those for lending banks, especially when poorly performing firms borrow 




The untabulated results show that the coefficient on the adjusted discretionary current accruals in year 
0 is -0.017 with a t-statistic of -2.52 when changes in net income from year 0 to year +1 are used as the 
dependent variable.  However, the coefficient on the adjusted discretionary current accruals in year -1 is 
not significant, suggesting that earnings management takes place mainly in year 0.  When we use the 
change in net income from year 0 to year +2, the coefficient on the adjusted discretionary current accruals 
in year 0 is again negative with a t-statistic of 2.37 and the coefficient on the adjusted discretionary 
current accruals in year -1 is not significant.  The negative and significant relation between discretionary 
accruals in the offering year and post-offering changes in net income is consistent with the findings of 
Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) and Rangan (1998), and suggests that the abnormally high accruals in 
year 0 that we document in the previous section are likely to be the result of intentional earnings 
management. 
 
B. Link between earnings management and announcement returns of equity offerings 
The main hypotheses we have examined so far rest on the premise that investors are fooled by 
earnings management and misprice the stock when seasoned equity is issued (Teoh, Welch, and Wang, 
(1998), Rangan (1998)).  However, in contrast to this assumption, Shivakumar (2000) shows that 
investors in the U.S. rationally infer earnings management from offering announcements and offset the 
effects of the earnings management at offering announcements.  Shivakumar (2000) argues that earnings 
management around the offerings is not intended to mislead investors, but reflects the rational response of 
issuers to anticipated market behavior at issue announcements.  In this section, we examine whether 
investors in Japan also see through issuers’ attempts to engage in earnings management and undo the 
price impact of earnings management.  
To address this issue, we first estimate abnormal returns around the announcement of equity 
offerings.  Table VII presents the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs).  We obtain announcement dates 
of equity offerings from daily issues of the Nihon Keizai Shinbun, which is Japan’s equivalent of the Wall 
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Street Journal.  We calculate the abnormal returns using two different approaches.  First, for each issue 
announcement, we calculate the daily abnormal returns using a standard event study methodology.   We 
obtain market model estimates by using 200 trading days of returns data, beginning 220 days before and 
ending 21 days before the issue announcement.  Our benchmark market return is the PACAP equally 
weighted market return.  We cumulate daily abnormal returns to obtain a CAR from day – t before the 
issue announcement to day + t after the issue announcement.  Second, we follow Shivakumar (2000) and 
compute abnormal returns as the difference in returns between the sample firm and a growth-matched 
firm that is chosen based on the growth rate of sales.   
We find that the mean CAR (-1, 0) and mean CAR (-1, +1) using the market model are, respectively, 
0.62% and 0.79%, both of which are significant at the 0.05 level.  The results using growth-firm adjusted 
returns are similar.  The positive and statistically significant CARs for Japanese firms that issue equity 
contrast sharply with much of the evidence on issuing firms from the U.S., which documents a 
statistically significant negative average stock market reaction around equity issuance announcements 
(Asquith and Mullins (1986), Smith (1986)).  These results are consistent, however, with those of Kang 
and Stulz (1996) and Cooney, Kato, and Schallheim (2003), who show that the stock price reaction to 
public placements of equity in Japan is significantly positive from 1985 to 1991 and from 1974 to 1993, 
respectively. 
To examine whether investors correct the price impact of earlier earnings management, we regress 
CAR (-1, 1) estimated using a growth-matched firm approach on the abnormal accruals in the offering 
year.  To render our results comparable to those of Shivakumar (2000), in addition to variables used in 
Table V, the regressions include the individual stock returns during the previous one year before the offer 
announcement and the market returns during the same period.  The regression results using the full 
sample are reported in Table VIII.  The coefficients on the abnormal accruals in regressions (1) through 
(4) are not significant.  These results are in contrast to those of Shivakumar (2000) and suggest that unlike 
in the U.S., Japanese investors are not able to detect issuers’ attempts to engage in earnings management.   
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In untabulated tests, we also find that the coefficients on the abnormal accruals are not significant in 
either boom or crisis period.  Thus, although it is argued that Japanese financial markets become more 
liberalized and efficient during the later part of our sample period, our results suggest that corporate 
earnings management continue to mislead the public. 
 
C. Alternative explanations 
C.1. Diversification motive of financing sources 
A concern in the interpretation of our results is that firms may engage in earnings management not 
because their main bank seeks to extract larger proceeds from the offerings, but because managers want to 
reduce the loans from their main bank and diversify financing sources.  This alternative explanation is 
consistent with findings in Table V, which shows a positive relation between abnormal accruals and the 
short-term main bank loan ratio in year -1, and in Table VI, which shows a negative relation between the 
likelihood of an increase in short-term main bank loans from year -1 to year +1 and the short-term main 
bank loan ratio in year -1.  In untabulated tests, we investigate this alternative explanation as follows.  
First, we divide our sample firms into two groups, firms with poor past operating performance and 
firms with good past operating performance, and examine whether abnormal accruals and changes in 
short-term main banks’ loans are different between these two groups.  To the extent that the good 
performance group is more likely to easily access other means of financing offered by capital markets 
than the poor performance group, the alternative explanation suggests that compared to the poor 
performance group, the good performance group engages in more aggressive earnings management prior 
to the offerings and borrows less from the main bank after the offerings.  We find that when we use the 
ratio of operating income to total assets in year -1 as a measure of firm performance, the mean (median) 
adjusted discretionary current accrual in year 0 for the good performance group is 2.2% (2.2%) and that 
for the poor performance group is 2.4% (2.2%).  The mean (median) changes in the short-term main bank 
loan ratio from year -1 to year +1 and from year -1 to year +2 for the good performance group are, 
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respectively, 0.31% (0%) and 0.67% (0%) and those for the poor performance group are -0.07% (-0.03%) 
and 0.79% (0%).  Tests of differences in mean and median abnormal accruals and of differences in mean 
and median changes in the short-term main bank loan ratios across the two subsamples do not reject the 
null hypothesis that they are equal.  Similar results obtain when we use past excess stock returns and the 
standard deviation of the ratio of operating income to total assets over the past 10 years as measures of 
firm performance.  These results are not consistent with the prediction of a diversification story.  
Second, it can be argued that large firms generally find it easier to secure external financing and are 
less likely to rely mostly on bank borrowing for their financing than smaller firms.  Therefore, the 
alternative explanation based on the diversification motive predicts that compared to small firms, large 
firms engage in more aggressive earnings management prior to offerings and borrow less from their main 
bank after offerings.  However, the results show that there are no discernible differences in abnormal 
accruals and changes in short-term main bank loan ratios between small and large firms.  
Third, the diversification story suggests that firms that engage in aggressive earnings management 
prior to the offerings are more likely to be in the capital markets to secure funds with which to diversify 
their financing sources.  This argument implies that compared to firms with a single issuance of public 
equity (securities), those with multiple issuances of public equity (securities) during our sample period are 
likely to manage earnings more aggressively and borrow less from their main bank after the offerings.   
However, the results show no differences in abnormal accruals and changes in short-term main bank loan 
ratios between firms that make only one issuance of public equity and those that make multiple issuances 
of public equity, or between firms that make only one issuance of public equity and those that make 
multiple issuances of public securities such as equity, straight debt, and convertible bonds.  Overall, these 
results are not consistent with the alternative explanation based on the diversification motive of financing 
sources.18 
18 In untabulated tests, we examine whether the probability of raising capital from the financial markets depends 
on the financial health of the main bank.  Using a logit regression analysis in which the probability we model is the 
likelihood of issuing either equity, straight bonds, or convertible bonds, we find that during a sample period of 1983 
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C.2. Regulatory rules concerning public equity offerings in the 1980s 
Until 1996, public equity offerings in the Japanese stock market were heavily regulated (Hoshi and 
Kashyap (2001)), with firms required to satisfy the issuance criteria set by each of the major securities 
companies before being allowed to issue new shares.  The criteria extended to profits, requiring that (1) 
the firm have ordinary profits (after taxes) that are equal to or greater than 10 yen per share in the 
previous year, and (2) the firm’s ordinary profits (after taxes) after a new stock issue be expected to 
increase (Hirota, 1999).19  In April 1996 these regulations were abolished.  Given these rules, one may 
expect the results in this paper to be driven in part by regulatory effects for the period before April 1996.  
For example, the previous section shows that poorly performing firms are more likely to engage in 
income-increasing earnings management than good performing firms.  To the extent that poorly 
performing firms have to manage earnings more aggressively in order to satisfy the issuing criteria, this 
result is consistent with the view that regulatory rules concerning public equity offerings in the 1980s 
increase firms’ incentives to manage earnings in the way that our paper suggests.  Although we use 
performance-adjusted accruals to mitigate this concern and we control for the past operating performance 
of an issuer in the regression analysis, it is still possible that regulatory effects drive some of our main 
results. 
To further investigate the effect of regulatory rules on earnings management, we split our sample of 
431 issuing firms from 1983 to March 1996 according to the two issuing criteria listed above: (1) whether 
the firm’s ordinary profits (after taxes) are equal to or greater than 10 yen per share in the previous year, 
and (2) whether the firm’s post-offering ordinary profits (after taxes) increase.  The results are reported in 
Table IX.  We find that abnormal accruals are positive and significant for all subsamples and their 
 
to 2003, firms with a poorly performing main bank in the PACAP database are less likely to raise capital elsewhere 
than firms with a good performing main bank.  This result suggests that firms with a financially weak main bank 
have difficulties obtaining external financing and thus are more likely to be influenced by their main bank.  We also 
find that firms with higher Tobin’s q are more likely to issue securities. 
19 These rules were introduced in February 1973.  
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differences in mean and median abnormal accruals are not significant.  Thus, although regulatory equity 
issuance requirements on firm performance may have an effect on incentives to manage earnings upward, 
our results are not consistent with such explanation. 
 
C.3. Endogeneity bias 
In interpreting our regression results, the degree to which the main bank relationship is endogenously 
determined must be taken into account.  It is possible that certain types of firms choose to have a certain 
type of main bank relationship.  For example, if poorly performing firms borrow extensively from banks, 
and if earnings management simply reflects this poor performance, we might detect a spurious relation 
between bank financing and earnings management.  To address this endogeneity issue, we re-estimate the 
regressions in Table V using the two-year lagged values of bank loans as instrumental variables.  In 
untabulated tests, we find that the results from the instrumental variables regression are similar to those 
reported in Table V.  We also use the three-year lagged values instead of the two-year lagged values and 
find that the results are similar. 
Another endogeneity issue is whether our findings reflect a causal link between bank ties and 
earnings management.  Perhaps clients of poorly performing banks are themselves poorly performing 
firms, in which case the results have nothing to do with disincentives faced by banks to monitor.  Using 
lagged bank ties as an instrument is not an appropriate solution to this problem since main bank ties may 
be stable over time by definition.  We address this issue by dividing our sample into good and poorly 
performing firms according to the median ratio of cash flows to total assets and then examining whether 
the financial health of affiliated main banks of each group is different across these two subsamples.  
Untabulated tests show that the financial health of main banks, measured by the ratio of operating income 
to total assets, market-adjusted cumulative excess returns, or the standard deviation of the ratio of 
operating income to total assets over the past 10 years, is statistically indistinguishable between good and 
poorly performing firms.  While the financial health of main banks measured by Tobin’s q is significantly 
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different between these two types of firms, the results are opposite in that poorly performing firms are 
associated with main banks with a higher Tobin’s q.  Thus, it is unlikely that our results are driven by the 
fact that financially weak banks are mainly associated with poorly performing clients. 
 
C.4. Alternative measures of bank relationships 
To check the robustness of the results on the link between bank ties and earnings management, we re-
estimate the regressions in Table V using an alternative measure of bank relationships.  If the bank’s 
disincentive to monitor the issuer’s income-increasing earnings management is largely due to preserving 
its debt claims on borrowers, then the size of the main bank’s outstanding claim (i.e., the face value of the 
main bank’s loans to the firm) may be arguably a more appropriate measure of the main bank’s exposure 
to the firm than the main bank’s share of the firm’s debt.  To test this view, we re-estimate the regressions 
in Table V by replacing the bank loan ratios with the face value of the bank loans.  The results are 
qualitatively similar.  We find that the coefficient on the log of short-term loans from the main bank is 
negative and significant for the full period and the 1993-2002 subperiod.  The coefficient on the log of 
long-term loans from the main bank, however, is not significant.  
 
C.5. Past performance of borrowers 
Our main results so far are that during a banking crisis, firms engage in more aggressive earnings 
management when their main bank has a large debt claim and that the main bank’s debt claim declines 
following the issue.  We argue that it is the bank’s incentive to preserve its claims on borrowers and the 
lack of its monitoring resources, that cause these results.  However, these results are also consistent with 
the following alternative story:  Firms with low cash flows increase their borrowings from their main 
bank, consistent with main banks having a responsibility to firms in financial trouble.  Such firms are also 
likely to manage earnings and to sell equity to receive a cash infusion.  Following the cash infusion, the 
firm pays down some of its temporarily large claim to its main bank.  According to this story, there is no 
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causality running from the main bank’s disincentives to the firm’s behavior, but this story is also 
consistent with the results we document above.  To examine whether this alternative story can also 
explain our results, in untabulated tests we again divide our sample into firms with high cash flows (cash 
flow / total assets) and those with low cash flows according to the sample median in year t-1 and then 
compare the change in loans before the offering from t-2 to t-1 and the change in loans after the offering 
from t-1 to t+1.  We find that for low cash flow firms, the mean and median changes in short-term main 
bank loans from year t-2 to year t-1 are -0.0012 and 0.000, respectively.  For high cash flow firms, the 
corresponding numbers are 0.0093 and 0.000, respectively.  Tests of differences in mean and median 
changes in short-term main bank loans across the two subgroups strongly reject the null hypothesis that 
they are equal (t-value=3.00, z-value=3.07).  Thus, prior to equity issuance, main banks tend to collect 
more short-term loans from poorly performing firms than from good performing firms.  We also find that 
from year t-1 to year t+1, the mean and median changes in short-term main bank loans for low cash flow 
firms are statistically indistinguishable from those for high cash flow firms.  Taken together these results 
are not consistent with the predictions of the alternative story based on past performance of borrowers.   
 
C.6. Banks as underwriters 
Japan’s Securities and Exchange Act of 1948 prohibited banks from underwriting securities until 
1992.  However, echoing the 1990s relaxation of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act, which permits U.S. 
commercial banks to underwrite corporate securities, beginning April 1, 1993, the Financial System 
Reform Act (FSRA) in Japan removes restrictions that separated commercial and investment banking and 
allows Japanese commercial banks to provide investment banking services.  Under the FSRA, Japanese 
commercial banks were allowed to establish subsidiary securities firms, and beginning October 1999, 
these subsidiary securities firms started to underwrite equity.  Since unlike debtholders, underwriters have 
incentives to sell new shares at lower prices to make it easy to find potential buyers for equity offerings 
(Loughran and Ritter (2002)), banks are likely to have conflicting incentives in influencing firms to 
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engage in earnings management when they serve as the underwriter as well as the lender.20  To examine 
whether the extent of earnings management by equity-issuing firms when the main banks serve as both 
their underwriters and their lenders is different from that when the main banks are only lenders, we 
separate our sample into issues in which the main banks serve as both underwriters and lenders and issues 
in which the main banks serve only as lenders.  Out of 508 observations in our sample, 26 (5.1%) equity 
issues are underwritten by the security firms that are subsidiaries of the main bank of the issuing firm.  
The mean (median) earnings management for this group is 0.017 (-0.015). On the other hand, the mean 
(median) earnings management for the remaining 482 observations in which underwriters are not 
subsidiaries of the main bank of the issuing firm is 0.023 (0.022).  Thus, the level of earnings 
management is lower when banks serve as both the underwriter and the lender than when banks serve 
only as the lender.  However, the difference in mean (median) earnings management across the two 
groups is not statistically significant. 
 
VI. Summary and conclusions 
Using a sample of 508 issues of Japanese seasoned equity offerings from 1983 to 2002, this paper 
examines whether bank incentives to monitor borrower opportunistic behavior are affected by the health 
of the banking sector and the bank’s financial condition.  We find that firms with short-term ties to a main 
bank, as measured by the ratio of a firm’s short-term borrowings from its main bank to total debt, engage 
more aggressively in earnings management around public equity offerings.  This result, however, is 
observed only during 1993-2002, a period during which the Japanese economy experienced a significant 
deterioration in the financial health of the banking sector, and is most pronounced for poorly performing 
firms that maintain lending ties to a financially weak main bank.  These results suggest that during a 
20  For a discussion of two competing views (certification and conflict of interest) regarding the role of 
commercial banks in underwriting the securities of firms with which they maintain lending relationships, see 
Kroszner and Rajan (1994), Puri (1996), and Gande, Puri, Saunders, and Walter (1997).  Unlike these studies that 
examine bond pricing in the U.S. and find results that are consistent with the certification view, Hamao and Hoshi 
(2004) and Kang and Liu (2007) examine bond pricing in the post-FSRA period in Japan and find results that are 
broadly consistent with the conflict of interest view.  Using a sample of Israeli IPOs, Ber, Yafeh, and Yosha (2001) 
also present evidence of conflicts of interest in combining bank lending, underwriting, and fund management. 
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banking crisis, the bank’s incentives to preserve its claims on borrowers and the lack of its monitoring 
resources provide weak banks disincentives to monitor the opportunistic financial reporting behavior of 
equity-issuing borrowers prior to an offering. 
We also find that the post-offering short-term lending relationship between main banks and issuers 
becomes significantly weaker for issuers that manage earnings aggressively in the offering year.  Our 
result suggests that when the entire banking sector suffers from the credit crunch, banks have strong 
incentives to reduce credit to firms that are relatively weak but can raise capital on their own.  These 
results, together with those of Peek and Rosengren (2005), suggest that during a banking crisis, Japanese 
banks allocate more credit to troubled borrowers and less credit to borrowers that are still economically 
viable. 
Although our tests identify earnings management around a borrower’s equity financing during a 
banking crisis as the mechanism through which banks preserve their claims on borrowers, these 
incentives faced by banks could also arise in other instances.  The questions of when the costs of strong 
bank ties outweigh the benefits, of when banks exercise strong control over client firms, and of when 
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Distribution of public equity offerings by year and industry  
 
The sample consists of 508 issues of Japanese seasoned equity offerings from 1983 to 2002.  The sample comes from the Tokyo Stock Exchange Annual Securities 
Statistics, supplemented by Thomson Financial Securities data and NEEDS corporate finance-related data.  Firms belonging to either financial services or utilities 
industries and those that issued multiple classes of securities within three years prior to or subsequent to the offering are excluded from the sample. 
 Construction Manufacturing Wholesale &  
retail trade 
Real estate Transportation & 
communication 
Services Total 
1983 3 35 11 1 1 2 53 
1984 2 45 10 2 1 4 64 
1985 0 24 7 0 2 0 33 
1986 3 19 6 0 1 1 30 
1987 2 11 8 1 1 2 25 
1988 6 31 10 1 3 3 54 
1989 7 63 18 2 5 2 97 
1990 2 22 4 1 5 3 37 
1991 0 12 2 0 0 2 16 
1992 1 4 1 0 0 0 6 
1993 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
1994 4 2 4 0 1 0 11 
1995 0 3 1 0 0 0 4 
1996 2 12 2 0 0 0 16 
1997 1 1 3 0 0 1 6 
1998 0 2 2 0 0 1 5 
1999 0 5 9 1 0 7 22 
2000 0 5 3 0 2 3 13 
2001 0 4 2 1 0 1 8 
2002 1 4 2 0 0 0 7 






The sample consists of 508 issues of Japanese seasoned equity offerings from 1983 to 2002.  The sample comes 
from the Tokyo Stock Exchange Annual Securities Statistics, supplemented by Thomson Financial Securities 
data and NEEDS corporate finance-related data.  Firms belonging to either financial services or utilities 
industries and those that issued multiple classes of securities within three years prior to or subsequent to the 
offering are excluded from the sample.  Tobin’s q is the ratio of the sum of the book value of debt and the market 
value of equity to total assets. Firms are considered to be members of a keiretsu if they belong to any of the six 
bank-centered keiretsu (Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Fuyo, DKB, and Sanwa).  The main bank is a firm’s 
largest lender.  The standard deviation of operating income is the standard deviation of the ratio of operating 
income to total assets over the past ten years. 
 Mean Median 1Q 3Q Standard 
deviation 
Issuer/Issue characteristics      
Market value of equity (in billion yen) 130.527 37.074 17.216 88.712 388.070 
Total assets (in billion yen) 136.675 34.770 19.403 61.129 449.650 
Issue amount (in billion yen) 9.395 3.749 1.862 8.324 19.630 
Issue amount / market value of equity 0.086 0.088 0.054 0.117 0.048 
Operating income / total assets 0.069 0.062 0.038 0.087 0.047 
Market-adjusted excess returns over     
the past 1 year 
0.145 0.063 -0.107 0.319 0.417 
Leverage (debt / total assets) 0.654 0.680 0.518 0.815 0.195 
Tobin’s q 2.059 1.750 1.364 2.300 1.188 
Bank loans / total debt 0.254 0.246 0.104 0.366 0.187 
Short-term bank loans / total debt 0.157 0.140 0.049 0.235 0.133 
Long-term bank loans / total debt 0.096 0.058 0.001 0.145 0.120 
Main bank loans / total debt 0.089 0.071 0.040 0.115 0.069 
Short-term main bank loans / total debt 0.053 0.040 0.018 0.072 0.052 
Long-term main bank loans / total debt 0.036 0.017 0.0003 0.050 0.051 
Other bank loans / total debt 0.177 0.147 0.068 0.244 0.181 
Short-term other bank loans / total debt 0.112 0.093 0.032 0.161 0.119 
Long-term other bank loans / total debt 0.066 0.032 0.0003 0.092 0.111 
Equity ownership by financial institutions 0.275 0.259 0.162 0.376 0.143 
Equity ownership by other corporations  0.318 0.301 0.173 0.453 0.181 
Equity ownership by foreigners  0.052 0.027 0.005 0.077 0.060 
Fraction of firms belonging to a keiretsu 0.187 0 0 0 0.390 
Main bank characteristics      
Operating income / total assets 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.005 
Market-adjusted excess returns over the 
past 1 year 
-0.0004 -0.113 -0.212 0.171 0.316 
Tobin’s q 

















Mean and median asset-scaled income from operation, cash flow from operations, and accruals around 
public equity offerings  
The sample consists of 508 issues of Japanese seasoned equity offerings from 1983 to 2002.  The sample comes 
from the Tokyo Stock Exchange Annual Securities Statistics, supplemented by Thomson Financial Securities 
data and NEEDS corporate finance-related data.  Firms belonging to either financial services or utilities 
industries and those that issued multiple classes of securities within three years prior to or subsequent to the 
offering are excluded from the sample.  Cash flow from operations is measured as the ratio of net income minus 
accruals to the prior year’s total assets.  Current accruals are measured as the change in current assets other than 
cash and short-term investments in the two consecutive years ending in year t less the change in current liabilities 
other than debt in the two consecutive years ending in year t.  Adjusted discretionary current accruals are 
calculated by subtracting industry- and performance-matched non-issuers’ discretionary current accruals from 
issuers’ discretionary current accruals.  Discretionary accruals are the differences between the actual accruals and 
the nondiscretionary accruals.  Predicted (i.e., nondiscretionary) accruals are estimated using the cross-sectional 
adaptation of the modified Jones (1991) model.  A non-issuer is matched to each issuer by industry (using the 
two-digit industry code) and the ROA for each year from year -3 to year +3.  ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 0.01, 0.5, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Income from continuing operations / total assets (ROA) 
Year -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Mean 0.066*** 0.072*** 0.082*** 0.086*** 0.070*** 0.058***      0.050***
Median 0.053*** 0.058*** 0.069*** 0.071*** 0.058*** 0.050***      0.041***
Panel B: Cash flows from operations / total assets 
Year -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Mean 0.096*** 0.098*** 0.103*** 0.083*** 0.078*** 0.075***      0.072***
Median 0.086*** 0.086*** 0.104*** 0.075*** 0.079*** 0.066***      0.068***
Panel C: Current accruals 
Year -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Mean -0.003 -0.005 0.004 0.033*** 0.019*** 0.009*** 0.007*
Median -0.002 0.003 0.002 0.029*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.003 
Panel D: Adjusted discretionary current accruals (Issuers’ discretionary current accruals minus industry- and 
performance-matched non-issuers’ discretionary current accruals) 
Year -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Mean -0.007 -0.007 -0.004 0.023*** 0.010** 0.005 0.006 






Mean and median industry- and performance-adjusted discretionary current accruals in the offering 
year by subperiod and by industry 
 
The sample consists of 508 issues of Japanese seasoned equity offerings from 1983 to 2002.  The sample comes 
from the Tokyo Stock Exchange Annual Securities Statistics, supplemented by Thomson Financial Securities data 
and NEEDS corporate finance-related data.  Firms belonging to either financial services or utilities industries and 
those that issued multiple classes of securities within three years prior to or subsequent to the offering are 
excluded from the sample. Industry- and performance-adjusted discretionary current accruals are calculated by 
subtracting industry- and performance-matched non-issuers’ discretionary current accruals from issuers’ 
discretionary current accruals.  Discretionary accruals are the difference between the actual accruals and the 
nondiscretionary accruals.  Predicted (i.e., nondiscretionary) accruals are estimated using the cross-sectional 
adaptation of the modified Jones (1991) model.  A non-issuer is matched to each issuer by industry (using the 
two-digit industry code) and the ROA for each year.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.5, and 0.10 
levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Industry- and performance-adjusted discretionary current accruals in the offering year by subperiod 
 Sample  size            Mean         Median 
Boom period  
(1983 – 1989) 356           0.022
***              0.022*** 
Down period  
(1990 – 2002) 152            0.026
***  0.019** 
p-value of difference             0.713  0.997 
Panel B: Industry- and performance-adjusted discretionary current accruals in the offering year by industry 
 Sample  size       Mean      Median 
Construction 34       0.017    0.027 
Manufacturing 306         0.027***         0.026*** 
Wholesale and retail trade 103        0.017*     0.013 
Real estate 10       -0.034      -0.053 
Transportation and  
communication 23       -0.013     -0.020 
Services  32        0.031*      0.035 





Multivariate regressions of industry- and performance-adjusted discretionary current accruals in the offering year on bank loan 
ratios 
 
The sample consists of 508 issues of Japanese seasoned equity offerings from 1983 to 2002.  The sample comes from the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange Annual Securities Statistics, supplemented by Thomson Financial Securities data and NEEDS corporate 
finance-related data.  Firms belonging to either financial services or utilities industries and those that issued multiple classes of 
securities within three years prior to or subsequent to the offering are excluded from the sample.  The dependent variable is the adjusted 
discretionary current accruals in the year of the equity offerings.  Adjusted discretionary current accruals are calculated by subtracting 
industry- and performance-matched non-issuers’ discretionary current accruals from issuers’ discretionary current accruals. 
Discretionary accruals are the difference between actual accruals and nondiscretionary accruals.  Predicted (i.e., nondiscretionary) 
accruals are estimated using the cross-sectional adaptation of the modified Jones (1991) model.  A non-issuer is matched to each issuer 
by industry (using the two-digit industry code) and the ROA for each year from year -3 to year +3. Independent variables are measured 
at the fiscal year-end that comes immediately before the equity offerings.  The main bank is a firm’s largest lender.  The keiretsu dummy 
takes the value of one if a firm belongs to any of the six bank-centered keiretsu (Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Fuyo, DKB, and Sanwa).  
The standard deviation of operating income is the standard deviation of the ratio of operating income to total assets over the past ten 
years.  The post-1993 dummy takes the value of one if the firm issued equity during the 1993 to 2002 period, and zero otherwise.  
Tobin’s q is the ratio of the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of equity to total assets.  The dummy for poor operating 
performance of the main bank (issuing firm) takes the value of one if the ratio of operating income to total assets for the main bank 
(issuing firm) is smaller than the sample 25th quartile, and zero otherwise.  The dummy for poor previous 1-year excess returns of the 
main bank takes the value of one if the previous 1-year excess return for the main bank is smaller than the sample 25th quartile, and zero 
otherwise.  The dummy for a high standard deviation of main bank operating income takes the value of one if the standard deviation of 
operating income for the main bank is higher than the sample 75th quartile, and zero otherwise.  The dummy for low main bank Tobin’s 
q takes the value of one if Tobin’s q of the main bank is smaller than the sample 25th quartile, and zero otherwise.   The t-statistics are in 
parentheses.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.5, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Full period (1983-2002) 
             Full sample        Subsample with main banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Issuer / issue characteristics 
Total bank loans / total debt 0.06*** 
(2.65) 
       




      




      
Short-term loans from the main 
bank / total debt 












Long-term loans from the main 
bank / total debt 












Short-term loans from other 
banks / total debt 












Long-term loans from other 
banks / total debt 
































Operating income / total assets    -0.268 
(1.55) 
    


















Issue amount / market value of 
equity 




















Equity ownership by financial 
institutions 












Equity ownership by other 
corporations 










Equity ownership by foreigners  
 










Main bank performance (dummy)  





Poor previous 1-year excess 
returns 





High standard deviation of 
operating income 
      -0.006 
(0.51) 
 
Low Tobin’s q        -0.008 
(0.61) 
Main bank performance * issuer performance (dummy)  
Poor operating performance 
(main bank) * poor operating 
performance (issuing firm) 
    0.024
(0.90)
   
Poor previous 1-year excess 
returns (main bank) * poor 
operating performance (issuing 
firm) 
     0.061**
(2.41) 
  
High standard deviation of 
operating income (main bank) * 
poor operating performance 
(issuing firm) 
      -0.005
(0.18)
 
Low Tobin’s q (main bank) * 
poor operating performance 
(issuing firm) 


















F-value 7.03*** 17.53*** 4.21*** 2.43*** 2.26*** 2.15*** 1.88** 2.03**
Adjusted-R2  0.012 0.062 0.033 0.037 0.040 0.042 0.037 0.044




Panel B: Subperiod 
 Subperiod (1983-1992) Subperiod (1993-2002) 
    Full sample Subsample with main banks Full sample Subsample with main banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Issuer / issue characteristics             














































































































































Operating income / total assets   0.025 (0.10)      
0.229 
(0.52)     





















































Equity ownership by financial institutions 


































































Main bank performance (dummy) 
Poor operating performance    -0.007 (0.14)      
-0.030 
(0.92)    
Poor previous 1-year excess returns    -0.007 (0.43)      
-0.016 
(0.28)   
High standard deviation of operating 
income      
-0.002 
(0.13)      
-0.048 
(1.28)  
Low Tobin’s Q      -0.005 (0.30)      
-0.047 
(1.43) 
Main bank performance * issuer performance (dummy) 
Poor operating performance (main bank) * 
poor operating performance (issuing firm)   
0.004 
(0.14)      
0.152* 
(1.73)    
Poor previous 1-year excess returns 
(main bank) * poor operating 
performance (issuing firm) 
   0.041 (1.43)      
0.165* 
(1.93)   
High standard deviation of operating 
income (main bank) * poor operating 
performance (issuing firm) 
    0.012 (0.41)      
0.163* 
(1.77)  
Low Tobin’s q (main bank) * poor 
operating performance (issuing firm)      
0.063** 




























F-value 4.11*** 1.33 1.48 1.60* 1.46 1.83** 2.37* 2.10** 2.17** 1.72* 1.72* 2.10** 
Adjusted-R2  0.034 0.013 0.023 0.029 0.022 0.039 0.069 0.043 0.046 0.029 0.059 0.081 






Probit regression of changes in main bank loans on industry- and performance-adjusted discretionary current accruals in the offering year and firm characteristics 
 
The sample consists of 508 issues of Japanese seasoned equity offerings from 1983 to 2002.  The sample comes from the Tokyo Stock Exchange Annual Securities Statistics, supplemented 
by Thomson Financial Securities data and NEEDS corporate finance-related data.  Firms belonging to either financial services or utilities industries and those that issued multiple classes of 
securities within three years prior to or subsequent to the offering are excluded from the sample.  The dependent variable is a dummy variable that has a value of one if the change in bank loan is 
positive from the year preceding the offerings to the year subsequent to the offerings.  Independent variables are measured at the fiscal year-end that comes immediately before equity offerings 
except for adjusted discretionary current accruals in the offering year.  Adjusted discretionary current accruals are calculated by subtracting industry- and performance-matched non-issuers’ 
discretionary current accruals from issuers’ discretionary current accruals.  Discretionary accruals are the difference between actual accruals and nondiscretionary accruals. Predicted (i.e., 
nondiscretionary) accruals are estimated using the cross-sectional adaptation of the modified Jones (1991) model.  A non-issuer is matched to each issuer by industry (using the two-digit industry 
code) and the ROA for each year from year -3 to year +3.  The main bank is a firm’s largest lender. The keiretsu dummy takes the value of one if a firm belongs to any of the six bank-centered 
keiretsu (Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Fuyo, DKB, and Sanwa).  The post-1993 dummy takes the value of one if the firm issued equity during the 1993 to 2002 period, and zero otherwise.  
Tobin’s q is the ratio of the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of equity to total assets.  The Wald Chi-square statistics are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 0.01, 0.5, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 Full period (1983-2002) Subperiod (1983-1992) Subperiod (1993-2002) 
 Full sample Subsample with main banks Subsample with main banks Subsample with main banks 













































































Total bank loans / total debt 0.700
* 
(3.58)            
Short-term bank loans / 




(12.26)          
Long-term bank loans /  




(1.55)          
Loans from the main bank / 
total debt    
-3.975*** 
(8.47)   
-4.264** 
(6.39)   
-4.943* 
(3.34)   
Short-term loans from the 













Long-term loans from the 













Loans from other banks / 
total debt    
2.496*** 
(14.69)   
2.796*** 
(14.67)   
1.824 
(1.11)   
Short-term loans from other     2.876*** 1.729**  2.632*** 1.684*  9.279** 5.533* 
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banks / total debt (10.88) (3.91) (7.54) (3.08) (5.94) (3.24) 
Long-term loans from other 
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Equity ownership by 



































































































Mean of dependent variable 0.244 0.299 0.191 0.345 0.344 0.249 0.359 0.367 0.249 0.267 0.214 0.250 
Likelihood ratio (Chi-
square) 29.92 35.71 38.88 27.01 33.94 23.52 25.27 30.62 21.04 12.27 16.26 7.01 






Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the announcement of equity offerings 
 
The sample consists of 508 issues of Japanese seasoned equity offerings from 1983 to 2002.  The sample comes 
from the Tokyo Stock Exchange Annual Securities Statistics, supplemented by Thomson Financial Securities data 
and NEEDS corporate finance-related data.  Firms belonging to either financial services or utilities industries and 
those that issued multiple classes of securities within three years prior to or subsequent to the offering are excluded 
from the sample.  Abnormal returns for announcing firms are computed using two different approaches.  First, for 
each issue announcement, the daily abnormal returns are calculated using a standard event study methodology.  
Market model estimates are measured by using 200 trading days of returns data, beginning 220 days before and 
ending 21 days before the issue announcement.  The benchmark market return is the PACAP equally weighted 
market return.  Daily abnormal returns are cumulated to obtain a CAR from day – t before the issue announcement 
to day + t after the issue announcement.  Second, abnormal returns are computed as the difference in returns 
between the sample firm and a growth-matched firm that is chosen based on the growth rate of sales.  AD denotes 
announcement date.   ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.5, and 0.10 levels, respectively.                                                      
Event windows 
Market model Growth-matched firm  
Mean Median Mean Median 
(AD-1) 0.219* -0.030 0.152 0.136 
(AD) 0.405*** 0.025 0.688*** 0.520** 
(AD+1) 0.169 -0.187 0.396* 0.261** 
(AD-1, AD) 0.624** 0.147 0.840*** 0.722*** 






Table VIII  
Multivariate regression of three-day equity announcement returns [CAR (-1, 1)] on industry- and performance-adjusted 
discretionary current accruals in the offering year 
 
The sample consists of 508 issues of Japanese seasoned equity offerings from 1983 to 2002.  The sample comes from the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange Annual Securities Statistics, supplemented by Thomson Financial Securities data and NEEDS corporate 
finance-related data.  Firms belonging to either financial services or utilities industries and those that issued multiple classes of 
securities within three years prior to or subsequent to the offering are excluded from the sample.  The dependent variable is the 
CAR (-1, 1).  Abnormal returns are computed as the difference in returns between the sample firm and a growth-matched firm 
that is chosen based on the growth rate of sales.  Independent variables are measured at the fiscal year-end that comes 
immediately before equity offerings except for adjusted discretionary current accruals in the offering year.  Adjusted 
discretionary current accruals are calculated by subtracting industry- and performance-matched non-issuers’ discretionary current 
accruals from issuers’ discretionary current accruals.  Discretionary accruals are the difference between actual accruals and 
nondiscretionary accruals.  Predicted (i.e., nondiscretionary) accruals are estimated using the cross-sectional adaptation of the 
modified Jones (1991) model.  A non-issuer is matched to each issuer by industry (using the two-digit industry code) and the 
ROA for each year from year -3 to year +3.  The main bank is a firm’s largest lender.  The post-1993 dummy takes the value of 
one if the firm issued equity during the 1993 to 2002 period, and zero otherwise.  Tobin’s q is the ratio of the sum of the book 
value of debt and the market value of equity to total assets.  The t-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 0.01, 0.5, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 Full sample Subsample        with main banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 










Short-term loans from the main bank / total 





Long-term loans from the main bank / total 





Short-term loans from other banks / total debt   -0.044 (1.57) 
-0.050* 
(1.68) 
Long-term loans from other banks / total debt   0.021 (0.52) 
0.010 
(0.23) 
Individual stock returns in the previous year 







Market returns in the previous year before the 







Keiretsu dummy   -0.006 (1.01) 
-0.007 
(0.97) 
Log (market value of equity)   -0.001 (0.38) 
-0.001 
(0.38) 
Operating income / total assets   -0.065 (0.73) 
-0.094 
(0.79) 
Post-1993 dummy    -0.011 (1.51) 
0.001 
(0.14) 







Tobin’s q   -0.001 (0.21) 
-0.001 
(0.20) 
Equity ownership by financial institutions   -0.016 (0.72) 
-0.042* 
(1.61) 
Equity ownership by other corporations   0.025 (1.59) 
0.002 
(0.10) 












F-value 2.09 10.02*** 2.99*** 1.95** 
Adjusted-R2  0.002 0.067 0.061 0.037 




Adjusted discretionary current accruals in the offering year by regulatory rules 
 
The sample consists of 431 issues of Japanese seasoned equity offerings from 1983 to March 1996. The sample 
comes from the Tokyo Stock Exchange Annual Securities Statistics, supplemented by Thomson Financial 
Securities data and NEEDS corporate finance-related data.  Firms belonging to either financial services or utilities 
industries and those that issued multiple classes of securities within three years prior to or subsequent to the 
offering are excluded from the sample.  Adjusted discretionary current accruals are calculated by subtracting 
industry- and performance-matched non-issuers’ discretionary current accruals from issuers’ discretionary current 
accruals.  Discretionary accruals are the difference between actual accruals and nondiscretionary accruals.  
Predicted (i.e., nondiscretionary) accruals are estimated using the cross-sectional adaptation of the modified Jones 
(1991) model.  A non-issuer is matched to each issuer by industry (using the two-digit industry code) and the 
ROA for each year from year -3 to year +3. p-values are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
0.01, 0.5, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: By profits per share prior to public equity offerings 
 
 
Firm’s after-tax ordinary profits in the 
previous year are smaller than 10 yen 
per share (n=17) 
Firm’s after-tax ordinary profits in 
the previous year are equal to or 





               0.047** 
              (0.013) 
             0.023** 
             (0.023) 
0.199 
Median 
               0.040** 
              (0.049) 
             0.022*** 
             (0.000) 
0.194 
 
Panel B: By profit changes after public equity offerings 
 
 
The difference in after-tax ordinary 
profits before and after equity 
offerings is negative (n=226) 
The difference in after-tax ordinary 
profits before and after equity 




               0.026*** 
               (0.000) 
             0.022*** 
             (0.01) 
0.678 
Median 
               0.024*** 
               (0.000) 
             0.023*** 








Method for Measuring Discretionary Current Accruals 
 
Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) and Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2004) demonstrate that the 
modified Jones (1991) model performs best among the various discretionary accruals models.  This model 
has been adopted by many studies, including Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998), among others.  Following 
these studies, for each year in the test period we measure the coefficients of the current accrual models by 
estimating the following regressions for non-issuers who operate in the same industry as the issuers (to 
the first two digits of the industry code used in the PACAP Research Center database):21 
 
               ititititititit TARECREVTATACAC εββ +Δ−Δ+= −−− 11101 /)(// ,                              (a1) 
 
where CACit represents current accruals in year t for firm i;22 TAit-1 represents total assets (PACAP BAL 
#9) in year t–1 for firm i; ΔREVit represents revenues (PACAP INC #1) in year t less revenues in year t–1 
for firm i (i.e., change in revenues); and ΔRECit represents receivables (PACAP BAL #3) in year t less 
receivables in year t–1 for firm i (i.e., change in receivables).  We scale all variables in regression (a1) by 
total assets in year t–1 to reduce potential heteroskedasticity.  This cross-sectional regression is re-
estimated for each year and industry.  
We then compute nondiscretionary current accruals (NDCAC) for the sample firms as follows:  
 
1110 /)(/ −− + Δ − Δ                        = jtjtjtjtjt TARECREVbTAbNDCAC
                                                     
,                                   (a2) 
 
21 Following previous research (e.g., Jones (1991), Gaver, Gaver, and Austin (1995), Sloan (1996)), we estimate 
current accruals in year t as the change in current assets (PACAP BAL #6) other than cash (PACAP BAL #1) and 
short-term investments (PACAP BAL #2) in two consecutive years ending in year t less the change in current 
liabilities (PACAP BAL #13) other than short-term loans (PACAP BAL #11, which is the sum of short-term loans 
payable (JAF  #33), current portion of long-term debt (JAF #34), and current portion of bonds (JAF #35)) in two 
consecutive years ending in year t. Total accruals in year t are estimated as current accruals less depreciation, 
amortization, and depletion (PACAP JAF #74) in year t. 
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22 Current accruals are the change in noncash current assets minus the change in operating current liabilities.  
Specifically, CAC = ∆(current assets - cash) - ∆(current liabilities - short-term loans). 
where  and  are the estimated coefficients from regressions (a1).  0b 1b
Discretionary current accruals (DCAC) are computed as the difference between realized current 
accruals scaled by the prior year’s total assets and NDCAC. 
Following Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2004), we subtract the DCAC for a matching firm from that 
for an issuer where a non-issuer is matched to each issuer by industry (two-digit industry code) and asset-
scaled net income (i.e., ROAit).  We interpret this matching firm-controlled discretionary accruals 
estimate as a proxy for accruals manipulation. 
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